Difference between revisions of "Criminal Law (Xirnium)"

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==The Crime of Rape==
 
==The Crime of Rape==
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The following is intended merely as a summary of some of the many legal issues surrounding rape law in Xirnium, and is neither exhaustive nor complete.
  
 
===The Common Law===
 
===The Common Law===
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'''Defences to the Charge of Rape'''
 
'''Defences to the Charge of Rape'''
  
As already noted, the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent or that he was reckless as to whether or not the victim was consenting. The accused may, however, seek to raise the defence of an honest and reasonable yet mistaken belief in free and voluntary consent. The defence must demonstrate that the mistaken belief in consent was genuinely held at the time. The accused’s subjective state of mind is then tested against a harsh objective standard.
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As already noted, the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent or that he was reckless as to whether or not the victim was consenting. The accused may, however, seek to raise the defence of an honest and reasonable yet mistaken belief in free and voluntary consent. The defence must demonstrate that the mistaken belief in consent was genuinely held at the time, and that the accused was not aware of the victim’s lack of consent or reckless as to whether the victim was consenting. If so demonstrated, the accused’s subjective state of mind is then tested against a harsh objective standard.
 
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The possibility of this defence is unavailable in circumstances where the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting or where the accused did not turn his mind to the possibility that the complainant was not consenting (recklessness and wilful blindness). It is also unavailable where the accused’s mistake results in part from intoxication.
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A jury will only be allowed to consider whether the accussed had an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief in free and voluntary consent if a trial judge is first satisfied of the sufficiency of evidence produced by the defence supporting the possibility of such a claim, and if none of the circumstances making the defence unavailable are present.
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The possibility of this defence is unavailable in circumstances where the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting or where the accused did not turn his mind to the possibility that the complainant was not consenting (recklessness and wilful blindness). It is also unavailable where the accused’s mistake results from intoxication.
  
The common law definition of consent as “free and voluntary”, noted above, has been crafted to render the accused criminally culpable in situations where he engaged in sexual penetration without the victim’s consent believing that “no really means yes” or that “rough handling” is acceptable conduct for overcoming resistance. This stance is further entrenched by mandatory jury directions, and such circumstances are held to violate the reasonableness criterion of the defence.
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A jury will only be allowed to consider whether the accussed had an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief in free and voluntary consent if a trial judge is first satisfied of the sufficiency of evidence produced by the defence supporting the possibility of such a claim, and in cases where none of the circumstances making the defence unavailable are present.
  
The common law defintion of consent as given by a “a person with the cognitive capacity to give consent”, noted above, makes the defence of mistake unavailable where the victim is incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the act or was asleep, unconscious, or so intoxicated as to be incapable of freely agreeing, violating the reasonableness criterion.
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The common law definition of consent as “free and voluntary”, already noted, has been crafted to render the accused criminally culpable in situations where he engaged in sexual penetration without the victim’s consent believing that “no really means yes” or that “rough handling” is acceptable conduct for overcoming resistance. This legals stance is further entrenched by mandatory jury directions, and such circumstances are held to violate the reasonableness criterion of the defence of mistaken belief.
  
  

Revision as of 06:39, 18 February 2007

The Crime of Rape

The following is intended merely as a summary of some of the many legal issues surrounding rape law in Xirnium, and is neither exhaustive nor complete.

The Common Law

Rape is considered a serious crime in the Eternal Republic, the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment.


The physical and fault elements, respectively, of this offence are:

(a) that the defendant sexually penetrated, to any degree whatsoever, a person without his or her consent or that the defendant did not immediately cease sexual penetration of a person not consenting

(b) that the defendant had the mere intention to sexually penetrate, to any degree whatsoever, a person or to not immediately cease sexual penetration of a person not consenting


Unusual for a criminal offence in common law jurisdictions, the fault element for rape in Xirnium is that of strict liability. The prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant either had knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent or was reckless as to whether or not the victim was consenting; these are assumed upon mere satisfaction of the physical element of the crime.


The Standard of Consent

The common law defines consent as needing to be freely and voluntarily given by a person with the cognitive capacity to give consent.


Defences to the Charge of Rape

As already noted, the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent or that he was reckless as to whether or not the victim was consenting. The accused may, however, seek to raise the defence of an honest and reasonable yet mistaken belief in free and voluntary consent. The defence must demonstrate that the mistaken belief in consent was genuinely held at the time, and that the accused was not aware of the victim’s lack of consent or reckless as to whether the victim was consenting. If so demonstrated, the accused’s subjective state of mind is then tested against a harsh objective standard.

The possibility of this defence is unavailable in circumstances where the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting or where the accused did not turn his mind to the possibility that the complainant was not consenting (recklessness and wilful blindness). It is also unavailable where the accused’s mistake results from intoxication.

A jury will only be allowed to consider whether the accussed had an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief in free and voluntary consent if a trial judge is first satisfied of the sufficiency of evidence produced by the defence supporting the possibility of such a claim, and in cases where none of the circumstances making the defence unavailable are present.

The common law definition of consent as “free and voluntary”, already noted, has been crafted to render the accused criminally culpable in situations where he engaged in sexual penetration without the victim’s consent believing that “no really means yes” or that “rough handling” is acceptable conduct for overcoming resistance. This legals stance is further entrenched by mandatory jury directions, and such circumstances are held to violate the reasonableness criterion of the defence of mistaken belief.


Statutory Provisions

Admissible Evidence

The sexual reputation or disposition of the complainant is not admissible in any court process under any circumstances.


Mandatory Jury Directions

If the complainant did not say or do anything to indicate free and voluntary agreement, then this shall normally suffice to demonstrate that there was an absence of free and voluntary consent. Such is also enough to reject the claim that the defendant had an honest and reasonable yet mistaken belief in consent.


These lists are incomplete.