Order of November 24th
‘’’The Order of November 24th’’’ is a Fiefdom order that commemorates the ascension of Mobutu Sese Seko to the Presidency of the Republic of Zaire on 24th November 1965. The Medal of the Order consists of a gold star with an enamelled portrait of President Mobutu, surrounded by a laurel wreath. The ribbon is green (the shade of which is that found in the Zairian flag and not, as some think, that shade found in the Fiefdom flag) and possesses the state emblems of both the Republic and the Fiefdom. The Order’s existence remains a controversial one for contemporary political leaders, being the celebration of Mobutu’s dictatorship, but one that continues to harbour much in the way of popular support. The history of, and current status of the Order is emblematic of the nature of Zaire-Fiefdom relations, which has been more prevalent on a popular and ideological level as opposed to a diplomatic one.
History
The Order was instituted in February 1980 under Decree 8465 of the Presidium of the National People’s Soviet. The origins of this decision, though, are multifaceted and help to explain the pro-Zairian position of the Fiefdom and its people. These origins can be divided into ideological and historical.
Ideological Origins of Pro-Mobutism in the Fiefdom
Any understanding of the nature of Zaire in Fiefdom popular thinking must take into consideration the ideological backdrop to which all related matters, from Mobuto’s presence on Fiefdom paper money to the Order of November 24th all ultimately derive.
The Communist Party has, since the Revolution that propelled into power, commonly acknowledged that four ‘shining lights’ have guided the movement since its inception. Three of these are commonly expounded in Communist literature and, during the days of single-party rule, propaganda and consist of Marx, Lenin and Mao. The nature of the fourth ‘light’, however, has always remained something of a mystery to ordinary party members. Many have speculated that this fourth person is either Engels, co-founder of Communist theory, or Kim Sung-Il of North Korea. An examination of party archives, however, reveals that this person, mentioned during the Revolution and the years that followed it, was none other than Stalin. Though the Party never discusses the ideological legacy of Stalin, in recognition of the extreme bloodiness of his regime, his ideas have never officially been repudiated by either the Communist Party’s leadership or by its philosophers.
A central tenet of Stalinist thinking which has influenced Fiefdom politics has been the notion of ‘Socialism in One Country’, that is to say, that it is legitimate to work towards the establishment and preservation of state socialism in one country without necessarily having to support or sustain efforts to create a world-wide revolution. This has traditionally made the Fiefdom look favourably on attempts by other nations to interpret the notion of ‘Revolution’ for themselves and work those interpretations into formalised policy.
Zaire’s policies of Nationalism and Authenticity have, therefore, never been condemned by Party leadership during the Single-Party period despite their rejection of Eastern-style collectivism since it was believed that the policies of the Popular Movement of the Revolution were, in essence, interpretations of the wider revolution that would ultimately result in the worldwide communist state.
The second ideological, or more specifically a geo-political cause of Zaire’s favourable position in Fiefdom eyes was the Sino-Soviet Split and the problems that this caused in terms of pan-communist relations. The Fiefdom, in particular, was forced to walk a difficult tightrope during this period in appeasing both the Soviet Union and China, both of which were of primary importance for the island’s economy and protection. Many top Party officials, therefore, saw merit in the role of the non-aligned group, and in particular Zaire, in having cordial relations with both sides of the division, and with the Capitalist West, whilst also developing their own unique political institutions and ideologies. Zaire’s friendship with China and North Korea, in particular, allowed for much closer diplomatic ties between Port Sunlight and Kinshasa, which in turn promoted the favourable light in which officials viewed Mobutu and his regime.
Historical Origins of Pro-Mobutism in the Fiefdom
Ideological and political concerns were not the sole answer for Port Sunlight’s support of Mobutism and the rule of the Popular Movement of the Revolution. Other, more practical concerns were also at work during this period. In particular was the pessimism that was prevalent in much of the Soviet world during the 1970s, all the more striking after the heady days of optimism and hope that had been seen during the 1960s. The Fiefdom, like many nations in the political East, saw the 1970s as a period of stagnation and economic decline that contrasted with the apparent wealth and prosperity in the West. Party Leaders in Port Sunlight recognised this slump and, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, attempted to divert attention away from the on-going problems in the Fiefdom by lauding the so-called ‘achievements’ that were occurring elsewhere in the world, in particular the decolonisation of Africa. Propaganda during this time equated the decline of European empires in the continent with the gradual victory of peoples against foreign powers. Mobutu, who already possessed a position of some ascendancy in Communist eyes, was lauded as a beacon of hope for Africa and ‘a leading statesman for a true African national identity, devoid of tribal concerns and the bitter divisions of the colonial empires.’
The other major influence on Pro-Mobutism in Port Sunlight, irrespective of the apparent decline of the 1970s, was the indelible question of race. The first generation of Communist Leadership, personified in particular by the person of Noel Hoogaboom, had largely Caucasian in ethnicity in contrast to the Mesoamerican majority in the Fiefdom. The upcoming political leaders of the late 1970s, however, much more reflected the ethnic makeup of the island and, in so doing, created a stark contrast with the overwhelming white leaders that had gone before. Pro-Mobutism, therefore, provided an opportunity of demonstrating that the Fiefdom was more than simply a ‘white man’s club’ that legitimised itself by wrapping itself in the Red Flag. Lauding the achieve of black Africans against white Europeans provided, in the eyes of the Party at the time, a distraction from the questions of race and ethnicity that were being privately asked back home. Not only that, but the Zairian policy of promoting national as opposed to tribal or regionalist concerns also provided further inspiration for the Party’s attempt to create a national identity out of the bitter racial divide that had existed during the old Empire. Mobutu, therefore, became (in Fiefdom eyes) a worthy recipient of a position of honour on its paper money and, as in this particular example, for a medal honouring his achievements.
For all these reasons, therefore, the person of Mobutu and the policies of Zaire became increasingly important to the Fiefdom during the early 1980s. It is ironic, therefore, that these concerns have helped to sustain a level of pro-Zairianism in the Fiefdom that has endured long-after open political support of the regime has ceased. Not even the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the country’s current civil war has dampened the population’s support for Mobutu, as several recent opinion polls have testified. This, combined with the advent of free elections, increases the likelihood that new people will be given the Order of November 24th, some 15 years after the last nomination. Such an act would, undoubtedly, enflame International opinion.
