Difference between revisions of "Great Central African War"

Latest revision as of 14:26, 19 October 2007

Great Central African War
Date	July 2, 1996 - November 30, 1996
Place	Zaire
Result	Defeat of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre; preservation of the Mobutu regime.
Combatants Zaire Parthia (MACZ CAEEF Hutu génocidaires UNITA Mercenaries Ottoman Khailfah AFDL Angola Uganda Rwanda Burundi Commanders Mobutu Sese Seko Laurent-Désiré Kabila Strength 55,000 (Zaire) 20,000 (Parthia) 2,750 (CAEEF) 8,500 (Hutus) 1,750 (UNITA) 1,200 (mercenaries) 200 (Ottoman Khailfah) 12,000 (AFDL) 17,500 (Angola) 14,000 (Uganda) 2,000 (Rwanda) 2,000 (Burundi) Deaths 38,423 (Zaire) 167 (Parthia) 349 (CAEEF) 6,403 (Hutus) 798 (UNITA) 99 (mercenaries) 1 (Ottoman Khailfah) 11,997 (AFDL) 15,498 (Angola) 11,003 (Uganda) 1,584 (Rwanda) 297 (Burundi)

The Great Central African War, which lasted from July 2, 1996 - November 30, 1996 and drew in foreign players from around the world, has been called Africa's World War (outside Africa), the Great Patriotic War for the Salvation of the Fatherland (Zaire), the Zaire War (by African countries friendly or indifferent to Zaire), and the African Dirty War (by African countries hostile to Zaire, including countries that fought in the war). Between 3 million and 3.5 million civilians are believed to have died during the war, most of them in Zaire, but also in Angola.

Origins

In the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, which sent shockwaves of instability rippling through the region, precipitated a massive influx of up to two million Hutu "refugees," many of them former génocidaires, into Zaire. The advent of a new Rwandan Patriotic Front-led government terrified many Hutu, who feared reprisals by the Tutsis. In Zaire, the Hutus set up refugee camps, from which they launched cross-border raids into Rwanda. They also preyed upon Zairian Tutsis, known as Banyamulenge. The eastern regions of Zaire quickly disintegrated into anarchy, ethnic violence, and instability, precipitating a crisis. As slaughter and fear reigned, amid the havoc the Hutus continued to launch border raids into Rwanda; the anarchic situation in the east provided a haven as well for anti-Museveni rebels who used the area as a base of operations for raids into Uganda. In short order, anti-Tutsi sentiment, which had long simmered beneath the surface, manifested itself violently. This culminated, in early 1996, in the governor of Sud-Kivu issuing a decree that all Tutsis were to leave the province, or be killed. Rather than fleeing, the Tutsis decided to stand and fight. Aiding them, morally and materially, were RPF irregulars, determined to prevent a repeat of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The leaders of Uganda and Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, respectively, long resentful of Mobutu's failure to prosecute rebels using his country as a staging point, used this as an opportunity to get rid of the strongman once and for all. They turned to a former Maoist, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, whom Che Guevara had once described as lacking "revolutionary seriouness," to lead their offensive, so it would look like a purely Zairian operation. From the mid-1960s to the 1980s, Kabila had run a minor fiefdom, waging sporadic guerrilla warfare against the government, accumulating vast riches through smuggling and illegal mining, and gaining a reputation for brutality and kidnapping Westerners. He was known for his procrastination, heavy drinking, and womanizing, and was not generally seen as a "serious" revolutionary - hence Che's description. However, his credentials as an anti-Mobutist suited Museveni and Kagame's purpose nicely. Provided with supplies, training, and "volunteers," from Uganda and Rwanda, Kabila launched his invasion; the first major battle of the war, the Battle of Goma, took place on July 2, 1996.

The Great Central African War had begun.

The Battle of Goma

Goma is a small town of 160,000 people, adjacent to the Zairian-Ugandan border. On July 2, Kabila's rebellion, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (French: Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre), or AFDL, entered the town, where they encountered only minimal resistance. In fact, many of the town's denizens openly embraced the rebels as liberators. Citizens cheered and danced in the streets, and many of them bestowed the rebels with gifts; even the poorest of the poor gave what they had, to show their appreciation. The only ones not receptive to the rebels were the 200 or so FAZ troops stationed in the town. Ill-paid, poorly trained, and only recently recruited, the Goma FAZ were feared for their indiscipline, firebrand tempers, and routine harassment of locals, including sexual harassment of women and extortion of money from men and children. The frequently drunk and disorderly soldiers were, in short, far from popular. Moreover, they had little inclination to fight. When 25-40 AFDL guerrillas, most of them preteens, opened fire on the FAZ barracks, most of the troops dropped their weapons and began running. The few who stayed were killed or quickly surrendered. The FAZ lost 37 men, with 11 wounded. The AFDL suffered 2 deaths and 5 wounded.

The "battle," for lack of a better word, was over within forty minutes.

Rebel advances

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

The Battle of Goma marked the beginning of the Great Central African War.

Due to the deleterious state of Zairian communications, it took nearly three days for the news of Goma's fall to reach Kinshasa. There, reactions to the rebellion ranged from indifferent to amused. Few believed the rebellion would last more than a few days. Only General Donat Lieko Mahele advocated an immediate deployment of troops to the east; the other top military leaders, such as DSP commander General Nzimbi Ngbale and the Civil Guard's commander Baramoto Kpama Kata, felt little inclination to move their troops out of Kinshasa. While Mahele harangued them endlessly, warning prophetically that ignoring the rebels could mean the downfall of the nation, Nzimbi and Baramoto laughed it off.

President Mobutu Sese Seko, meanwhile, dithered at his palace in Gbadolite. An increasingly remote figure, he rarely made public appearances anymore, preferring instead to let his advisors run governmental affairs. When Honoré Ngbanda Nzambo-ku-Atumba, the head of SNIP, national security advisor, and presidential spokesman, warned Mobutu of the rebellion, Mobutu, then recovering from a serious illness, paid little heed. As Ngbanda's warnings became more and more insistent, his frustration grew; while Ngbanda was adamant about crushing the rebellion, Mobutu would speak listlessly for hours on end about how, if he "could do it all again," he would be a farmer.

On July 6, the town of Bukavu fell without a fight.

On July 20-23, the AFDL converged on Kisangani, where about 2,000 FAZ, led by General Mahele, awaited them. They faced less than 300 guerrillas. As soon as the sound of gunfire broke out, many troops broke and ran. In a rage, Mahele ordered his unit to fire upon the retreating columns, killing a few hundred. Cowardice, he said, would be punished by death. As the rebels entered the town, a bloody battle ensued. Mahele and his unit fought tenaciously, but about 500 FAZ troops, poorly paid and feeling no loyalty toward the Mobutu regime, decided to cast their lot with the rebels. A mutiny broke out, and General Mahele found himself facing not only the rebels but several of his own men. Announcing that he would go down "with all guns firing," Mahele and his loyalist troops resisted and held out for a few days, managing to kill most of the mutineers, but only a few of the rebels, who hid amid the confusion. By the evening of July 22, Mahele had less than 40 men left; all the mutinous troops were killed.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Rebels such as these were more than a match for the FAZ.

Exhausted and low on ammo, they were in no condition for another battle. During the long, grueling, bloody firefight, the rebels had recruited additional members and distributed guns among the populace, promising them food, money, and a better life if they joined the AFDL. As July 23 began, the rebel faction, now swelled to nearly 1,000, attacked and routed the remaining troops; Mahele and 3 of his troops barely escaped with their lives. At 2:00 A.M., the Zairian flag in Kisangani was lowered, and the rebel flag was raised. A looting spree soon broke out, as youths began smashing windows and destroying anything and everything bearing Mobutu's likeness.

When Ngbanda informed Mobutu of Kisangani's fall, Mobutu was stricken with panic and hysteria. Terrified nearly to the point of insanity by the prospect of being killed, he ordered the deployment of all DSP units and most FAZ units to Gbadolite without delay, leaving only a token force of 2,500 troops, who were divided into units of 100 and distributed throughout the country. Ngbanda and Mahele urged Mobutu to order an all-out offensive in the east to win the war, but Mobutu paid no attention. All that concerned him was the safety of himself and his family. Even when rumors began to surface of Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian involvement, Mobutu continued to insist upon the "strategic necessity" of keeping most of the military in Gbadolite. "The chief is the chief," he said. "A village without a chief is like a wounded gazelle that is helpless before the approaching jaws of the rapacious lion."

Nguza's plea

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

FAZ units such as this performed pitifully, forcing Mobutu to appeal to his allies for help.

By the end of July, Bumba had fallen into rebel hands. The FAZ abandoned the town virtually without a fight. Throughout the country, entire FAZ units surrendered or defected in droves. Many soldiers, before abandoning the towns they were assigned to protect, went on looting, killing, and raping sprees, inflicting the maximum amount of damage possible before donning the guises of peasants and fleeing - which served only to inflame the peoples' anti-Mobutu sentiments. The AFDL's membership swelled while the FAZ's plummeted. As images of FAZ soldiers bayoneting children, robbing merchants, raping women, and shooting up schools filled television screens around the world, a bevy of countries imposed strident sanctions on the regime, intensifying the country's already precipitous economic crisis. Aspiring to achieve a more prominent role in Central African politics, Burundi entered the fray, committing several hundred "volunteers" to join the AFDL. It seemed the end of the Mobutu regime was near.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

France, desperate to save Mobutu's regime, sent Serbian mercenaries to train his troops.

In desperation, Mobutu sent his foreign minister, Jean Nguza Karl-i-Bond, on a world tour to meet with what few heads of state remained that were friendly to Mobutu. From August 1-August 9, he met with King Hassan II of Morocco, General Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, President Omar Bongo of Gabon, Henri Konan Bédié of Côte d'Ivoire, and Abdou Diouf of Senegal. Hassan II, a rabid anticommunist and old friend of Mobutu, immediately promised to send troops, if Mobutu could find a nation to provide transport. Eyadéma said he would like to send aid, but was not sure if it was feasible to do so. Abacha, mindful of the aid Mobutu had provided Nigeria during the Biafran war in the late 1960s, was anxious to return the favor, but was already under much scrutiny from the international community, and was fearful of the repercussions he might suffer if he did send troops. Bongo, who had sent troops to Mobutu's aid during Shaba II, also indicated a willingness to help, but only if other nations (besides just Morocco) did the same. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal had always had warm relations with Zaire, and hinted that "if all hell broke loose," they would do what they could, if possible, but made no definitive promises.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Dictators Eyadéma of Togo (left) and Abacha of Nigeria (right) hinted at possible aid to Mobutu.

Nguza made overtures to several former allies in the Western world, but was cold shouldered by nearly all of them. Many not only refused to help Mobutu, but sympathized with the rebels, openly or secretly, although France, anxious to prop up the largest francophone nation in Africa, did make arrangements for two hundred notably psychopathic Serbian mercenaries, fresh from the killing fields of Kosovo, to help Mobutu. Yet, like Bongo, the French were hesitant to help without the participation of other nations. If they alone saved Mobutu, all of black Africa would accuse France of neo-colonialism and shun Paris.

Nguza also sent a message of distress to Zaire's most faithful backer, the Shahdom of Parthia, but the Shah, still reeling from the tragic cold-blooded assassination of his wife, was in no mood to see anyone. The Shah's Cabinet and the country's one-party parliament all advocated diligently for intervention on Mobutu's behalf, but they knew the final word was the Shah's, and no one was foolhardy enough to approach him during this time of profound grief, even if it was a dire emergency.

To Mobutu's chagrin, Nguza returned home with nothing to show for it but empty promises.

All the while, the AFDL continued its lightning-fast advance.

The Angolan intervention: "Shaba III"

In Luanda, the Angolan strongman José Eduardo dos Santos, a bitter antagonist of Mobutu since 1979 (the year dos Santos came to power), reveled at the chance to see the Zairian dictator go once and for all. Mobutu's support of UNITA, dos Santos's ambition to become a regional power broker, and most of all, Zaire's annexation of Cabinda in 1975, were reason enough for Angola to throw its weight behind the AFDL.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

UNITA bore the brunt of the fighting in Shaba.

dos Santos also hoped to stake a claim to Zaire's lucrative mineral riches. As the AFDL spread through the east like an incurable cancer, Angola attacked from the west, sending dozens of battalions of light infantry, armor, and mechanized infantry into Shaba, where they joined with descendants of Tshombe's Katangan gendarmaries, easily overpowering the token FAZ forces guarding the porously guarded but strategically important region. Even when the mining town of Kolwezi, home to thousands of Western expatriates, was seized, the West did nothing.

Ironically, the bulk of the fighting in Shaba was between foreigners; most of the forces battling the advancing Angolans were UNITA guerrillas, determined above all else to ensure that UNITA's last dependable foreign ally survived. Mobutu's fall would deprive UNITA of both its staging areas in Zaire as well as the significant aid it received from the Zairian government. Therefore, UNITA's own survival depended upon the survival of Mobutu's regime. While UNITA's guerrilla tactics, derived largely from the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, inflicted relatively heavy casualties on the Angolans, the Angolans were far superior numerically, and UNITA was forced to retreat, deeper and deeper into the country.

The Battle for Kinshasa

Tshikapa, Mbuji-Mayi, Kananga, Ilebo, and Kikwit each surrendered without firing a shot. With only sparse numbers of troops protecting them, as well as pro-rebel sentiment running high, they knew that resistance was futile. In fact, the mayor of Kananga, a Luba politician whose brother had died in police custody two months earlier, openly sided with the rebels, and ordered all Kanangan police and able-bodied men to "brandish their swords against the enemy," the enemy being Mobutu. Angolan forces linked up with the AFDL forces in the area, and they converged on their final target, Kinshasa, which had no more than 1,000 unpaid, unmotivated FAZ troops defending it.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Angolan transport planes were used to infiltrate rebel forces directly into Kinshasa.

Gambling that Angola would suffer no consequences from the international community, dos Santos, who had previously remained mum regarding Angola's involvement, began openly boasting of his support to the rebels. While many units were occupied along the border, fighting against Savimbi's forces, he deployed dozens of transport planes, to bring the rebels and his men directly to Kinshasa, so they could get there much more quickly.

In the last days of August, the first rebels, accompanied by Angolan paratroopers and elite police, along with Rwandan and Burundian "volunteers," were airlifted into the outskirts of Kinshasa, where they faced far more fierce resistance than they had anticipated.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Spurred on by Mahele's speech, this soldier stands ready to defend the city to the death.

General Mahele had previously given a three hour speech, projecting every iota of oratory and charimsa he possessed into it, haranguing his troops in patriotism, the need to defend their homes, etc., bringing tears to many eyes and giving previously lukewarm soldiers a rigid determination to defend Kinshasa to the death. Fear of reprisal was another impetus to fight; the previous day, Mahele had personally executed three generals for "wishy-washy cowardice," in front of thousands of spectators. Led by Mahele himself, the Kinshasa Defense Force engaged the attackers head-on, managing to shoot down several of their transport planes with antiaircraft artillery from North Korea. The invaders, most of them infiltrating via the air, made easy targets as they parachuted to the ground. More than 500 rebels, 1,200 Angolans, and several dozen Burundians died in their abortive attempt to land in the city. Even so, Mahele's forces were running perilously low on ammunition, and they were vastly outnumbered. Moreover, the bulk of Kinshasa's residents were less than thrilled with Mobutu's misrule, and Mahele and his men spent as much time fending off rioting mobs as they did rebels. The entry of several Angolan tank battalions into the city added further trouble.

Mahele fought courageously against overwhelming odds. Yet, his fight was a futile one. On September 7, after losing all but 40 or 50 of his men, he was forced to retreat from the city, and Kinshasa fell to the rebels. Kabila appeared on live television, demanding Mobutu's resignation.

It was then that, like a ravenous tiger awakened from a deep sleep, Parthia sprung into action, unleashing forces which would bring the rebellion to a violent end.

Enter Parthia

The wrath of the Shah soon rained down upon the rebels like fire and brimstone. "In Ahura Mazda's name," he vowed, "I shall smite these followers of Ahriman, and save Zaire and her people from the godless scourge of communism."

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Mobutu's old friend, King Hassan II of Morocco, was among the first leaders to come to his aid.

Parthia's contributions were far from insignificant. An entire division of paratroopers and several battalions of armor were airlifted into Kinshasa. 1,000 battle-hardened, tough, and unscrupulous Executive Outcomes mercenaries hired by the Shah himself accompanied them, as did the 2,750-man Central African Emergency Expeditionary Force (CAEEF), made up of 2,000 Moroccans and 750 Nigerians, Togolese, Ivoirians, Senegalese, and Gabonese, all transported by Parthia (Parthia also covered all the troops' expenses). The Serbian mercenaries sent earlier by the French, as well as between 8,000 and 9,000 pro-Mobutu Hutus, were airlifted from eastern Zaire to Shaba, where, aided extensively by Parthian air strikes and UNITA forces, they repulsed the Angolans back into Angola, where they were pursued until their remnants were bombed into oblivion. Another nation which rallied to Mobutu's side was Ottoman Khailfah, which, being contiguous to Zaire, was concerned that a power vacuum in Central Africa would contribute to further regional instability which could dramatically effect the Ottomans. Accordingly, Sultan Musafa bin Asad authorized the delivery of armaments to the FAZ, as well as the deployment of 200 military advisors. Interestingly, one of these advisors was a young Suliemen al Bashir the II, who would himself became sultan in the future. At the time, the future sultan was 28 years old and a newly appointed brigadier.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

The future Ottoman sultan, Suliemen al Bashir II, was a young brigadier and advisor to the FAZ at the time.

The Executive Outcomes mercs and the CAEEF units were airlifted to the east, where they halted the Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian advance and slowly beat back the invaders.

The morale of the rebels snapped. Commanded by the distinguished field marshal Ardeshir Nassiri, the Parthian-led coalition routed and slaughtered rebels by the thousands, while suffering minimal and inconsequential casualties. Nassiri also oversaw the public hangings of all people suspected of supporting the rebels, while doling out food, medicine, and cash to those who remained loyal to Mobutu. Bolstered by the prospect of victory, the FAZ experienced a huge surge of morale. General Mahele led a Zairian-Parthian counteroffensive which moved from Kinshasa to Shaba with astonishing rapidity, capturing every major city along the way. In most cases, the rebels surrendered without a fight; however, even those who voluntarily surrendered were killed, usually after being horrifically tortured. Brutal reprisals were also carried out against civilians accused of sympathizing with the rebels, or of not showing sufficient support for the FAZ.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Legendary field marshal Ardeshir Nassiri led the coalition.

Linking up with the Serbians, UNITA, and the Hutus, Mahele's forces launched an all-out invasion of northeastern Angola, embarking on a frenzied campaign of wanton destruction and terror, meting out vengeance of the most sinister kind to the innocent and guilty alike (although to his credit, Mahele did try, unsuccessfully, to discourage this). Angolan men were gruesomely tortured and murdered, women were gang-raped, and children were beaten, whipped, bayoneted, and often forced to kill their family members. More than 85% of the atrocities were committed by Zairians, with most of the remainder committed by the Serbs; however, UNITA was not above dealing harshly with Angolans who had supported the dos Santos government in the past. Altogether, as many as 100,000 Angolans were killed. Nassiri played with the idea of advancing all the way to Luanda, deposing dos Santos, and installing a pro-Western Savimbi-led government, but Mobutu discouraged this; the absence of a neighboring hostile government would mean the loss of a scapegoat for which he could otherwise blame Zaire's problems.

Humanitarian effort

As the war intensified, with increasingly frequent atrocities on all sides and a rapidly rising death toll, fears of a humanitarian crisis jolted the international community. A hard-hitting PBC documentary, titled Holocaust by Hunger: The Zaire War and its Effect on the Rural Poor, showed how the effects of the war directly exacerbated the already severe malnutrition suffered in rural areas.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Just one of many refugee camps that benefitted from the heroic work of men like Coscarelli and Zuna.

Hundreds of thousands had already perished of starvation; the PBC documentary (which won several awards and much acclaim) awakened the conscience of the world, and hundreds of countries, and thousands of humanitarian organizations converged on the country, and, safety permitting, administered medical aid to the sick and wounded and provided food, water, clothing, and shelter for refugees. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives were saved; many attribute this to the documentary. In fact, many clamored to have the narrator, Anastasio Coscarelli, win the Nobel Peace Prize, but to their consternation, that didn't happen. Even so, his efforts were widely recognized, and he became something of an international celebrity. Instead, fellow Pacitalian and future senior deputy prime minister of Pacitalia, Diego Zuna, won the peace prize, for his own efforts in trying to end the Great Central African War. Interestingly enough, it was the first time in many years that two people of the same nationality were Nobel Peace Prize candidates for the same reason and for their work fighting the effects of the same conflict.

Turning point

By the end of September, the AFDL had almost ceased to exist as a functioning force. More and more of the burden fell upon its allies, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola, to bear the brunt of the fighting. Although, to Burundi's credit, its president warned of "impending defeat," and quickly signed a treaty with Kinshasa before withdrawing his forces. Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola, however, did not share his foresight.

While the AFDL retreated to the jungle to recuperate and find new recruits, Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola committed several thousand new troops, who, while outnumbered and out-fought, managed to hold out for a month, most likely because they were more familiar with the terrain and area than the Parthians (who had by then taken over most combat roles) were. Casualties were hugely disproportionate, with Ugandans, Rwandans, and Angolans suffering enormous casualties and Parthia suffering almost none. Later on, when it was too, little too, late, they began adopting guerrilla warfare techniques, but the Parthians were as well versed in the art as they were, and they continued to suffer resounding defeats. On September 30, Nassiri announced (falsely) that he had just received a warhead from Persepolis, with instructions to attack Kampala; while this was a lie, Museveni fell for the bluff, and he hastily made peace and pulled back.

Rwanda's President Kagame, repulsed by Mobutu's intimate relationship with the Hutus, refused to "cop out" as Museveni had. Angola, too, held out, knowing that if they lost, an eventual UNITA victory in Angola was inevitable.

On October 4, a near-successful assassination attempt on Kagame quickly changed his mind; mortified and shaken, he called on all his troops to drop their weapons and trudge home. Only Angola held out.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

dos Santos's intransigence captured the ire of the Parthian Imperial Air Force, which extensively bombed the Angolan capital, Luanda.

Finally losing patience, on October 11, the Shah ordered the Parthian Imperial Air Force to "bomb some sense into the bastards." A three hour air strike was carried out against Luanda, leveling entire streets, reducing neighborhoods and business sectors to rubble, reducing more than 3/4 of the city to a wreck, killing almost a million people, and making nearly all the rest homeless. dos Santos, then on a trip to Uganda, where he tried in vain to persuade Museveni to rejoin the war effort, was not able to immediately reply. The Shah decreed that if no word of surrender was received by October 13, the Air Force would "finish the job." On October 12, dos Santos himself called the Shah to notify him of Angola's surrender. In return, the coalition forces began withdrawing from Angola, but not before leaving behind plenty of tanks, APCs, howtizers, and caches of ammunition for UNITA.

Endgame

For all intents and purposes, the war was over; however, sporadic guerrilla attacks in the Zairian jungle dragged the war on for over a month. Kabila's few forces were being rapidly depleted, forcing him to resort to hit-and-run attacks, booby traps, and other such tactics. While these managed to frustrate the Parthians - and even kill several - they did nothing to change the inevitable.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Kabila's use of child soldiers did little to help his rapidly dwindling popularity.

While Kabila was able to quickly replenish his reserves - often by kidnapping scores of rural children - his forces were usually killed faster than he could replace them. Toward the end, he began resorting to increasingly brazen and desperate tactics, such as sending children suicide bombers against Parthian grunts, booby trapping the dead bodies of Parthian soldiers, and sending terrified kidnapped villagers into battle in human waves. Kabila's tactics did little more than decrease his own dwindling popularity and bolster the government. What few recruits he had found themselves being killed off when they attempted to invade new villages (which were being armed by Parthian soldiers). On November 29, Kabila and forty-seven "shocktroops" (mostly preteens doped up heavily on marijuana) engaged in their final battle; all the troops were killed, and Kabila was mortally wounded before disappearing into the bush, presumed dead.

The following day, Kabila's second-in-command (serving as "commander" from an air-conditioned office in Dar es Salaam) announced the AFDL's unconditional surrender.

The war was over.

Kabila's capture

Kabila, thought to be dead, was discovered in a dense pocket of rain forest on December 17, 1996, gravely wounded, infected with a tropical illness, delirious, and barely alive. He was immediately airlifted to the capital, where he was publicly tortured and executed before a live audience in the 20th of May Stadium; afterwards, his dismembered remains were paraded through the streets of Kinshasa.

Aftermath

The war had profound effects upon the region. The previously hostile regimes of Museveni and Kagame were now cowed and submissive, timidly subservient and tripping over themselves in their efforts to placate Mobutu. Ugandan and Rwandan military forces rigorously patrolled their borders, to ensure that, in the event rebels infiltrated Zaire in the future, it could not be attributed to them. In Angola, UNITA finally gained the upper hand, managing, by 1999, to overthrow dos Santos, who retreated into exile. Savimbi became president of a moderate, West-leaning Angola with a democratic government and a mixed economy with characteristics of both free-market capitalism and democratic socialism. Most importantly - for Zaire - Mobutu's rule was cemented more firmly than ever before, and none would ever again be foolhardy enough to challenge him.

<div" class="plainlinksneverexpand">

Mobutu milked "his" victory to the fullest, to drum up popular support. Here, he waves to the crowd during a military parade.

The Shah's decision to intervene was very popular in Parthia, as most Parthians thought very highly of Zaire, whatever its faults. PNN polls showed that more than 85% of Parthians "strongly favored" their nation's involvement in the war.